This paper investigates the social optimality of linear quadratic mean field control systems with unmodeled dynamics. The objective of agents is to optimize the social cost, which is the sum of costs of all agents. By variational analysis and direct decoupling methods, the social optimal control problem is analyzed, and two equivalent auxiliary robust optimal control problems are obtained for a representative agent. By solving the auxiliary problem with consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is designed, and from perturbation analysis its asymptotic social optimality is proved. The results are further applied into the study of opinion dynamics in social networks. The evolution of opinions is analyzed over finite and infinite horizons, respectively. All opinions are shown to reach agreement with the average opinion in a probabilistic sense.
games [29] . Bauso, Tembine and Basar applied the result of robust mean field games into opinion dynamics and proved the convergence property of the population distribution [30] . In [31] , [32] , mean field LQ social control with local disturbance was considered based on different information patterns.
Social networks and opinion dynamics have also received much attention from the systems and control community in recent years [30] , [33] [34] [35] [36] . An important feature of social networks is exchange and discussion of opinions between individuals. The opinion dynamics focus on how individuals' opinions form and evolve over time through interactions with their peers. It has been observed that numerous phenomena, such as emulation, mimicry and herding behaviors, often occur when multiple social groups interact [30] . Many models of opinion dynamics are agent-based models where each individual is represented by an agent and the individual opinion on a topic is represented by a real value, evolving in time, such as Degroot model [34] [35] [36] . As the dimension increases for large-population networks, calculation and analysis of agent-based models get more and more complicated. This promotes us to introduce new approaches to overcome the difficulty.
In this paper, we study mean field LQ social optimal control problems with unmodeled dynamics, in which both the state equation and the individual cost function are coupled by the mean field term. Different from the previous work [31] , mean field terms are involved not only in the cost function, but also in the state equation, which brings about much difficulty to the problem. In order to design decentralized strategies based on mean field approximations, we construct two auxiliary robust optimal control problems by social variational and direct decoupling methods, respectively. Both auxiliary optimal control problems are shown to be identical when the number of agents N → ∞ and mean field approximations are applied. By solving the auxiliary robust optimal control problem we design a set of decentralized strategies, which is further shown to have the property of asymptotic social optimality. Furthermore, we apply the above results into the analysis of opinion dynamics in social networks. Our results can be seen as a generalization of [30] , in which Bauso, Tembine and Basar studied the integrator opinion dynamics by mean field games and obtained the convergence property of the population distribution. We give a detailed analysis of the opinions evolution and convergence properties in a general case. The difference between agents' opinions and the network average opinion is proved to be stochastically bounded. An explicit expression between probability distribution and bound of opinions deviation from average opinion is obtained by eigenvalue analysis, analytic geometry and martingale inequality. The long time behavior of opinions is also analyzed by stochastic stability theory. All opinions are shown to reach agreement with the average opinion in a probabilistic sense.
The main contributions of the paper are listed as follows.
• Using variational analysis and direct decoupling methods, we derive two equivalent auxiliary robust optimal control problems. By solving the auxiliary optimal control problem subject to consistent mean field approximations, we obtain a set of decentralized strategies.
• By verifying the convexity-concavity property of the social control problem with unmodeled dynamics, it is proved that the decentralized strategies have the property of asymptotic robust social optimality.
• The evolution of agents' opinions is analyzed in a general case by the mean field control approach. An explicit expression between probability distribution and bound of opinions deviation from average opinion is obtained by using eigenvalue analysis and martingale inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the socially optimal control problem with unmodeled dynamics is formulated. In Section III, centralized strategies are analyzed by the methods of variational analysis and direct decoupling. In Section IV, decentralized strategies are designed by solving the auxiliary problem subject to consistent mean field approximations. In Section V, the set of decentralized strategies is proved to have asymptotic social optimality. In Section VI, the stochastic bounded property of opinions is verified over finite and infinite horizons, respectively. In Section VII, the evolution of opinions is simulated. Section VIII concludes the paper. Notation: Throughout this paper, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, and R n×k the set of all n × k matrices. We use · to denote the 2-norm for a vector or the F-norm for a matrix. For a matrix M, M T denotes its transpose. For a symmetric matrix M, M > 0 (M ≥ 0) means that M is positive (non-negative) definite.
For a symmetric matrix Q and a vector z, z 2 Q = z T Qz. Given any matrix L, we write tr(L) to denote its trace. For a family of R n -valued random variables {x(λ ), λ ≥ 0}, σ (x(λ ), λ ≤ t) is the σ -algebra generated by the collection of random variables. Let ⊗ be the Kronecker product. Let C([0, T ], R n ) denote the space of all the R n -valued continuous functions on [0, T ], and C b ([0, ∞), R n ) be the space of all the bounded continuous functions on [0, ∞).
We use C (C 0 , C 1 , ...) to denote generic constants, which may vary from place to place.
II. SOCIALLY OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEMS

A. Dynamics and Costs
Consider a large population system with N agents. The dynamics of the ith agent is given by the following
where x i (t) ∈ R n and u i (t) ∈ R m are the state and input of agent i, respectively. {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are a sequence of mutually independent d-dimensional Brownian motions defined on a complete probability space (Ω, F , P).
is the mean field term which reflects the overall effect of the population to each agent. f i (t) ∈ R n is an unknown local disturbance, which can be considered as the disturbance from the external environment or unmodeled dynamics. The constant matrices A, B, G and σ have compatible dimensions. For notational brevity, the time argument of a process is often suppressed when its value at time t is used. Denote u = (u 1 , ..., u N ) and
The cost function of agent i is given by
The constant matrices or vectors Q, H, R 1 , R 2 , Γ, Γ 0 , η and η 0 have compatible dimensions; Q ≥ 0, H ≥ 0, R 1 > 0, and R 2 > 0. The social cost is defined by
B. Two Solutions Based on Different Information Patterns
We study social optimal control problems under two types of information sets. First, we define the following admissible control sets for different information patterns:
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Each strategy u i ∈ U c i is generated by initial states and Brownian motions of all agents, hence strategies in U c i are centralized. On the contrary, each strategy u i ∈ U d i is generated by the state and the Brownian motion of agent i, so strategies in U d i is decentralized. Then there are two problems based on the different control sets.
(PA) Find a social solution u(·) with centralized strategies to minimize the social cost J (N)
(PB) Find a social solution u(·) with decentralized strategies to minimize the social cost J (N)
We impose the following assumption.
(A1) The initial states {x i0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent with Ex i (0) =x 0 and there exists a finite constant C 0 independent of N such that max 1≤i≤N E x i (0) 2 ≤ C 0 .
III. CENTRALIZED STRATEGIES
In this section, we explore centralized strategies for Problem (PA) by variational analysis and direct decoupling methods, and obtain two auxiliary problems (P1) and (P1 ). 
A. The Social Variational Method
The variational analysis is based on person-by-person optimality, and the benefit is that one can only perturb the control of a representative agent and keep the controls of other agents unchanged. Fixû −i andf −i , and perturb
The difficulty in obtaining the evolution of the state of a representative agent is that the dynamics of all agents are coupled by the mean field term. The first step is to obtain the variation of the mean field termx (N) . By perturbing
Noting for agent j, δ x j (0) = 0, j = i, this implies δ x j = δ x k , for any j, k = i, which further leads to
By solving this equation, we obtain
Now we turn to derive the variation of the social cost function. From (2), the cost variation of agent i is given by
For agent j, j = i, we have
Thus, the variation of the social cost function is given by
When N is large enough, we may approximatex (N) andx (N) −i by a deterministic functionx. The zero first-order variational condition combined with mean field approximations gives
From observations, the above equation is the zero first-order variational condition for the following cost function:
In the above, v(t) is obtained by interchanging the order of integrations
Based on the above discussion, we construct the following auxiliary robust optimal control problem.
where v is determined byv
Problem (P1) is a single-agent robust optimal control problem, which is derived by the first-order variational condition and mean field approximations. In the next subsection, we will use a straightforward but complicated method to obtain an exact problem with N agents.
B. The Direct Decoupling Method
Now we obtain an exact problem by direct decoupling. Without loss of generality, we assume that the terminal terms of cost functions are 0. The methodology is that first decouple the mean field term in the dynamics and then separate the social cost function to obtain the terms affected by u i and f i .
Lemma 1 If the initial Problem (PA) has a centralized optimal solutionû = (û 1 , ...,û N ), then it is necessary that u i is optimal for the following problem:
where j = i and
Proof: Note that u i , f i ∈ U c i , andû −i ,f −i have been specified in advance and does not change with
Because the dynamics of all agents are coupled by mean field term, even ifû −i is specified in advance, the state x j , j = i, is also varying along with u i . The first one which needs to do is that separate the system equation into two parts. The first part evolves with u i , f i , and the next part does not evolve with u i , f i . Noting that the mean field termx (N) included in the dynamics of each agent, we first deal with this term. From (1) we have
where j = i. Adding all N−1 agents j, j = i and dividing N in the both sides of the above equation we can obtain the dynamics ofx
By solving the above linear SDE, we havé
where
−i is divided into two terms. φ i does not change with u i and f i , and φ i changes with u i and f i . The method can be similarly applied tox j , j = i. Then we have
From this we obtainx
Similarly, ϕ i does not change with u i and f i ; ϕ i changes with u i and f i . From (9) and (11), we have φ i and ϕ i are O(x i /N), and there is a relationship between φ i and ϕ i , i.e., φ i = [(N − 1)/N]ϕ i . Furthermore, we have the following relationships:
With the help of these relationships, we turn to deal with the social cost function to find out the terms which are affected by the perturbations of u i and f i . For agent i, we have
For agent j, j = i, one can obtain
Then by (8)-(14), for the social cost function J
From the viewpoint of optimal control, for the social cost function we can only keep the terms related to u i and f i , and omit the irrelevant terms that are not useful in the optimization problem. Then we have −i with a deterministic functionx and designing decentralized strategies.
IV. DECENTRALIZED STRATEGIES DESIGN
In the previous section, we obtained the optimal control Problems (P1) and (P1 ) for a representative agent.
Because there is a mean field termx (N) in the dynamics (4) andx (N) −i in the cost function (7) , the solutions of (P1 ) are centralized. In order to obtain a decentralized strategy, we now solve Problem (P1) by the maximum principle.
Lemma 2 For Problem (P1), suppose that (A1) holds, and there exists a symmetric matrix S satisfying the following differential Riccati equation (DRE)
Then we have the following results.
(i) The cost functionJ i (u i , f i ) is strictly concave in f i for all u i ∈ U d i .
(ii) The saddle-point solution (the optimal control and the worst-case disturbance) is given by
where P is the solution of the following DRĖ
and s satisfies the following differential equatioṅ
whereĀ
Proof. (i) Since (17) has a solution S, by [37, Chapter 6.5] the following problem admits a unique solution:
subject to
This further implies that (P1) is strictly concave in f i .
(ii) It is easy to verify that (P1) is strictly convex in u i . From the proof of Theorem A.4 in [37] , (P1) has a saddle-point strategy. By the maximum principle, the following FBSDE has a unique adaptive solution (x i , p i , q i ):
and the saddle-point strategy is given by
By Chapter 2 of [38] or [39] , we obtain that the DRE (17) admits a solution and p i = Px i + s, where s satisfies (18) . Thus the saddle point solution is given by (16) .
After the strategies in (16) are applied, the dynamics of agent i can be written as
Then the dynamics of the mean field termx (N) is obtained as follows:
When N → ∞, (1/N)Σ N j=1 σ dW j vanishes due to the law of large numbers. As an approximation tox (N) , we obtain the aggregate effectx which is a deterministic function satisfying
Now we obtain the following system of differential equations
For further analysis, we impose the following assumptions.
(A2) For the matrix R 2 , R 2 > (r * ) 2 I, where r * = inf{r > 0 : S solves (15) in which R 2 = r 2 I}.
(A3) There exists a solution (x, v, s) in C([0, T ], R 3n ) for the equation system (22) .
Denote
Then (22) can be rewritten as 
We now give a sufficient condition that ensures (A3).
Proposition 1 If the following DRĖ Thus, we obtainK
By (25) and (26), we haveẋ
By the proof of Proposition 1, if the DRE (24) admits a solution K ∈ C([0, T ], R 2n×n ), then we can solve the equations system (22) and obtain a solution (x, v, s) in C([0, T ], R 3n ).
V. ASYMPTOTIC SOCIAL OPTIMALITY
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic performance of the decentralized strategies (16), where P and s are given by (17) and (18) . We first provide some preliminary results for asymptotic analysis.
Lemma 3 Assume that (A1)-(A3) hold. Under the decentralized strategies (16), the following holds:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 Assume that (A1)-(A3) hold. For any N, there exists C 1 independent of N such that
Lemma 5 Under (A1)-(A3), the following equation holds:
Proof. Let ϑ (t) = v(t) − P(t)x(t) − s(t). By (22) and some elementary computations, we obtain
The solution of the above differential equation is ϑ (t) ≡ 0. This completes the proof.
Denote J (N) soc (û,f ) as the social cost under the decentralized strategies (16) . We now give the asymptotic social optimality of the decentralized strategies. Let and H diag(H, ..., H) . We can write Problem (PA) as minimizing the social cost under the worst-case disturbance, i.e.,
Assume that (A4) The following DREṠ given by (16) has asymptotic robust social optimality, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix B.
VI. APPLICATIONS IN OPINION DYNAMICS
In this section, we apply the above results into analyzing opinion dynamics in social networks. Consider a population of scalar agents, where each agent is characterized by an opinion x i . In opinion dynamics, we can consider the control variable u i as the variation rate of the opinion of agent i. A zealot attempts to change agents' opinions in a way that is proportional to his advertisement efforts f i , i = 1, · · · , N. For the dynamics (1), by choosing A = a, G = −a, and B = 1, we can write the opinion dynamics of a social network in the following form
The corresponding cost function of agent i is given by
Note that the above cost is in a LQ tracking-type form. Minimizing such cost implies that all agents are willing to mimic the average population behavior as happens in herd behaviors or crowd-seeking attitudes. The social cost function is given by J
, f (·)). By Lemma 2, we obtain that for the system (27)- (28) , the optimal control with the worst-case disturbance is given bŷ
where p satisfies the following DREṗ
and s is determined by
By Proposition 1, we further have the following result.
Proposition 2 For the equations (29) and (30), we have s = −px, where p is the solution of the DRE (29).
Proof. From Proposition 1, there exists a 2 × 1 matrix K satisfying
By (29) and (31), we obtain k 1 = h and k 2 = −p. This further implies that (32) admits a unique solution α(t) ≡ 0 in C([0, T ], R 2 ). Thus we obtain s = −px.
Suppose that the population state average x (N) is accessed, we obtain s = −px (N) by replacingx with x (N) . This is reasonable because by Lemma 3, x (N) andx are closed enough when the number of agents is large enough. Then the corresponding control law and disturbance are given by
Substituting u i and f i into the opinion dynamics (27) , the closed-loop dynamics of x i can be written as
We further have the dynamics of mean field term x (N) satisfying
It can be seen that Ex (N) (t) =x 0 , since Ex i (0) =x 0 . By (34) and (35) we obtain
Now we construct a microscopic model for the social network. To this end, let us collect all opinions into an opinion vector X(t) = [x 1 (t), ..., x N (t)] T . Writing all N states into a state vector form, by (34) we have
where X (N) is an N × 1 vector whose terms all are x (N) , W = [W 1 , ...,W N ] T is a N-dimensional Brownian motion and ς = diag[σ , σ , ..., σ ].
For later analysis, let us introduce the Laplacian and averaging matrices. Denote
where L is called the Laplacian matrix of a fully connected network and M is called the averaging matrix. Note that L = I − M, L 2 = L and MX = x (N) 1 = X (N) . Now, our aim is to analyze the derivation of the opinions from their average. For the error vector, we can write the expression below which relates e(t) to X(t):
Note that Me(t) = 0. By (36) and (37) we obtain
The following result establishes that the error process {e(t), t ≥ 0} is stochastically bounded, which implies that all opinions reach agreement with the average opinion in a probabilistic sense.
Theorem 2 For the system (27)- (28) , suppose that a + ( 1
Under the control law and disturbance (33) , for each π ∈ (0, 1] there exists an ε(π) > 0 such that
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 2 Theorem 2 can be seen as a generalization of Theorem 4.3 of [30] and it gives an explicit expression between probability distribution and bound of opinions deviation from average opinion.
A. Long Time Behavior of Opinions Evolution
Now we consider the long time behavior of opinions evolution in the social network. Note that the system (27)-(28) is controllable and observable. For (29), we introduce the following algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
Suppose that the above ARE has a solution in R such that a+( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p ≤ 0. Let the control law with the disturbance be given by
where p is chosen as the maximal solution of (39), and s ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R) is determined by the following differential equations:
By direct computations, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For (40), we have s = −px, where p satisfies the ARE (39) .
Proof. Suppose s = kx. By (40) we obtain
By the ARE (39), we further obtain k = −p as the solution to the equation (41) .
As the discussion above, we have s = −px (N) by replacingx with x (N) . The control law with the disturbance are given by
Let us collect all opinions into a opinion vector X(t) = [x 1 (t), ..., x N (t)] T . Under the above control law (42), we obtain the dynamics of the opinion vector satisfying
Define the error vector as e(t) = X(t) − x (N) 1 = (I − M)X(t). By (43), the dynamics of e(t) satisfies
Then we have the counterpart of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 For the system (27)- (28) , assume that (39) has a solution such that a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p ≤ 0. Under the control law and disturbance (42), for each π ∈ (0, 1] there exists an ε(π) > 0 such that
Proof. Since this proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, we focus on different parts. By (44) and Me(t) = 0, we obtain
Similarly, letting A a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p (L + M), rewrite the dynamics for the error vector as de(t) = Ae(t)dt + Lς dW (t). The eigenvalues of A are
This implies that A is non-positive definite. Define the Lyapunov function V (e) = 1 2 e T e. Applying the infinitesimal generator (C.1) to the Lyapunov function V (e), we have L V (e) = e(t) T Ae(t)
Next we show that there exists a finite positive scalar κ and 
Letting κ = r, we have L V (e) ≤ 0 for all e(t) / ∈ N κ . This implies that V (e(t)) is a non-negative supermartingale when e(t) is not in N κ . By Lemma 6, we obtain ε(π) = max 2κ π , 2EV (e(0)) π . By a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 2, the theorem follows.
VII. SIMULATION
In the simulation, we choose a = 0.5, σ = 1, r 1 = 1, r 2 = 1.5 to simulate the opinions evolution in a social network with 20 agents. The initial opinions are taken independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 100]. By computation, the solution of ARE (39) is p = 3.79, and a+( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p = −0.76 satisfying the assumption of Theorem 3. From Fig. 1 , it can be seen that the opinions reach consensus roughly. All opinions evolve within a certain range around average opinion. From Fig. 2 , it is shown thatx is close tox (N) . This shows the rationality of mean field approximations by which a deterministic functionx is substituted for the mean field term x (N) .
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the social optimality of LQ mean field control with unmodeled dynamics.
The socially optimal problem is analyzed by variational and direct decoupling methods, which leads to two equivalent auxiliary robust optimal control problems. Decentralized strategies are designed by consistent mean field approximations, and it is proved that the decentralized strategies has asymptotic social optimality. Applying the mean field control approach, the evolution of opinions are analyzed over finite and infinite horizons, respectively.
It is shown that the opinions converge to the average opinion in a probabilistic sense. For the future work, an interesting problem is to consider robust mean field social control problems with major players.
APPENDIX A PROOFS OF LEMMAS 3 AND 4
Proof of Lemma 3. From (20) and (21), we have
t 0 e (Ā+G)(t−s) σ dW i (s).
February 28, 2020 DRAFT By (A1), one can obtain
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Proposition 1, we obtain thatx and s ∈ C([0, T ], R n ) and
which further gives
Thus we have
This with (16) completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Then by (1) and (19), we have
It follows from (3) that
From this we haveJ
By [40] with (B.2), this gives inf
soc (ũ,f ) = 0. By direct computation, we obtain
By (17), (18) , (19) , (B.1) and Itô's formula,
From this and Lemma 4, we obtain
The theorem follows.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need a lemma.
Lemma 6 Suppose there exists a twice differentiable function V and a number κ > 0 such that for V (e(t)) > κ, L V (e(t)) ≤ 0, where L is the infinitesimal generator of the process {e(t), t ≥ 0}. Let τ 1 = τ 1 (κ) be the first entry time of {e ∈ R N |V (e) ≤ κ}. Then for each π > 0 there exists an ε(π) such that P sup
where ε(π) = EV (e(0))/π.
Proof. The main proof is based on Theorem 3 and Theorem 18 of [41] . We chooseN > κ, and stop the process when it leaves the region {e ∈ R N |κ < V (e) <N}. Then V applied to the stopped process is a supermartingale because L V (e(t)) ≤ 0. When lettingN → ∞, we have that the process stops for V (e(t)) = κ w.p. 1. By Theorem 18 of [41] , we obtain
which implies P sup 0≤t≤τ 1
V (e(t)) < ε) > 1 − EV (e(0)) ε .
Letting ε = EV (e(0))/π, we complete the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Me(t) = 0, equation (38) can be rewritten as de(t) = a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p(t) (L + M)e(t)dt + Lς dW (t).
Letting A a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p (L + M), rewrite the dynamics for the error vector as de(t) = Ae(t)dt + Lς dW (t).
Note that A = diag(â, ...,â), whereâ = a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p , and its eigenvalues are
Under the condition a + ( 1 r 2 − 1 r 1 )p(t) ≤ 0, t ∈ [0, T ], A is non-positive definite for t ∈ [0, T ]. Next we use Lyapunov function theory to analyze the error process. By [30] , the infinitesimal generator of the error process e(t) is given by L = e T A d de + 1 2 Nσ 2 tr L T d 2 de 2 L . Letting κ = r max , we have L V (e) ≤ 0 for all e(t) / ∈ N κ . This implies that V (e(t)) is a non-negative supermartingale when e(t) is not in N κ .
We now analyze the process e(t) by Lemma 6. For e(0) / ∈ N κ , we define the first entry time τ 1 (κ) by τ 1 (κ) = inf{s > 0 : e(s) ∈ N κ }.
The first exit time ν 1 (κ) behind τ 1 (κ) is defined by ν 1 (κ) = inf{s > τ 1 : e(s) / ∈ N κ }. is a supermartingale for t ∈ [0, τ 1 ) and [ν i , τ i+1 ), i ≥ 1, respectively. By Lemma 6, we have P sup 0≤t≤τ 1
V (e(t)) < ε(π) > 1 − π., February 28, 2020 DRAFT where ε(π) = EV (e(0))/π. We further obtain P sup 0≤t≤τ 1 e(t) < 2EV (e(0)) π > 1 − π.
For {e(t), t ∈ [τ i , ν i ), i ≥ 1}, we set ε(π) = κ and then obtain P sup
Because V (e(t)) is continuous with respect to the time t, we have V (e(ν i )) = κ. By Lemma 5, one can obtain P sup
Note that π ∈ (0, 1], 2κ π ≥ 2κ. Based on the above discussion, we complete the proof of the theorem by setting ε(π) = max{ 2κ π , 2EV (e(0)) π }. For e(0) ∈ N κ , we can similarly define the exit times ν i , i ≥ 1, and the entry times
The remainder of the proof is similar to the above. 
